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Observer, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
The Caucasus, one of the world's most turbulent regions, is the scene of half a dozen 
active and many more latent conflicts. The current Russian offensive against Chechnya 
may reignite old conflicts and set off new ones. The war dramatically exacerbates 
historical injustices and ethnic tensions endemic to the area.
The Kremlin's current military operation in Chechnya differs substantially from the 
military campaign of 1994-96. For example, during the first war, the Russian media 
reported regularly on the mass civilian casualties caused by the Russian army in 
Chechnya. Now, however, there is virtually no reporting from the Chechen-controlled 
areas because the journalists are staying away. Whereas they found ways to 
circumvent the travel restrictions imposed by the military during the previous conflict, 
this time they are exercising self-censorship because they fear for their lives. 
The absence of the Chechen point of view in Russian media coverage and the current 
support of the majority of the population for the military campaign allow the federal 
forces to implement mass artillery and long-range bombardments, which inevitably 
increase civilian casualties, without fear of a negative reaction from the Russian 
population. During the last war it was precisely the media criticism and public outrage 
that somewhat restrained the Kremlin. Considering that even in that conflict there were 
more civilian than military casualties, the Kremlin's new campaign is likely to bring about 
a calamity in Chechnya.
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The introduction of Russian forces into Chechnya sharply complicates the overall 
situation in the Caucasus in the North Caucasus republics as well as in the independent 
states of the Transcaucasus. The start of the new Russian-Chechen war has added to 
tensions elsewhere in the region. 
In addition to the social and political destabilization typical of the entire former Soviet 
Union, three factors specific to this area increase the probability of new violent conflicts: 
• In both the states of the South Caucasus and the republics of the North Caucasus, 
borders were drawn arbitrarily and do not correspond to areas of compact ethnic 
settlements.
• The process of rehabilitating the peoples that were deported by Stalin and 
restoring them to their lands remains incomplete.
• Since the Russian-Chechen war of 1994-96, there has been a marked increase in 
the activity of radical Islamic groups.
The following account examines each of these factors in light of the renewed warfare in 
Chechnya and identifies areas of latent hostilities which are most at risk of escalating 
into violence. The final section notes the destabilizing effect of these developments for 
Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Arbitrary Borders
Most tensions in the Caucasus stem from the federal and territorial arrangements of the 
Soviet Union. In the 1920s and the 1930s, borders were drawn in a provocative way, 
frequently with the goal of dividing nations, violating historic and ethnic realities. These 
arrangements were aggravated further over the course of Soviet history and the 
subsequent conflict-ridden existence of the post-Soviet states. 
Now at least four Caucasian nations are divided by international borders:
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• Armenians live in three compact settlements in three different states: Armenia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and the Dzhavakh region of Georgia.
• Besides the Azerbaijani state, the Azeris live in a compact settlement in Georgia 
near the border with Azerbaijan. 
• The Ossetians live in North Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation, and 
in South Ossetia, which is part of Georgia.
• The Lezgin compact settlement zone spans the Russian-Azerbaijani border.
Bloody armed conflicts have occurred in some of these regions (i.e., Nagorno-
Karabakh, South Ossetia) while the situation in others (i.e., Lezginstan, Dzhavakh) is 
very tense, characterized by occasional demands for independence and autonomy 
status, respectively.
A significant number of North Caucasian peoples are divided by internal or 
administrative borders. For example, the Kabardians, Cherkess and Adygeis form one 
ethnic community of Circassians, but live in three separate regions of the Russian 
Federation: Adygei, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardin-Balkaria. The Balkar and 
Karachai peoples form one ethnic group and speak one language but their area is 
divided into administratively separate regions. Although there has been discord for 
several years in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, tensions became particularly acute in May 
after a Karachai, General Semenov, won the presidential elections, which were viewed 
by the Cherkess candidate, Stanislav Derev, and his supporters as having been rigged. 
This provoked the Cherkess to demand the separation of Cherkess land from 
Karachaevo-Cherkessia (to be attached instead to the Stavropol region) unless the 
results of the election were annulled. Elsewhere, Dagestan's Khasavyurt district is home 
to the Akkin Chechens, who consider themselves to be citizens of the Chechen 
Republic and consequently participated in the 1997 Chechen presidential elections. 
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To date the regions mentioned above have experienced political agitation but tension 
has not led to violence. The fighting in Chechnya threatens to turn these latent conflicts 
into new hot spots.
Territorial Rehabilitation of the Exiled
Another point of tension in the Caucasus results from the rehabilitation of persecuted 
peoples Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars and Meskhetian-Turks. When Stalin and 
Beria deported the members of these nations to Central Asia in 1944, they also 
abolished the corresponding autonomous republics and national regions. These 
territories were divided between the neighboring republics and krais. For example, the 
Karachai autonomous oblast was divided among Krasnodar krai, Stavropol krai and 
Georgia; Balkaria was given to Georgia; and Prigorodny krai, a part of Checheno-
Ingushetia, was given to North Ossetia. 
When the exiled peoples were allowed to return in 1957, the 1944 borders were 
reinstated for the most part. There were exceptions, however. A significant portion of the 
modern territorial conflicts in the North Caucasus stem from these exceptions. For 
example, the Karachai and Cherkess autonomous oblasts were united. As indicated 
above, the Cherkess now seek to secede. The Prigorodny region of the Chechen-
Ingush ASSR remained part of the North Ossetian ASSR. Violent clashes there in 1992 
were only suppressed with the use of peacekeepers, and have led to sporadic violence 
over the last few years. The fact that Chechen autonomy within the Dagestan ASSR 
was never reinstated is now seen as a serious grievance by the 70,000 Akkin 
Chechens.
One of the most tragic cases is the Meskhetian-Turk nation that now resides in the 
North Caucasus and seeks repatriation to Georgia, whence the people were deported in 
1944. The Russian and regional governments are eager to see them go, but the 
Georgian government hesitates to facilitate their return. The Georgians fear to 
exacerbate relations with the restive Armenian minority that now resides in Dzhavakh 
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and would face displacement. Turkey has given refuge to a small number of Meskhetian 
Turks, but most remain stranded in a very hostile Russian environment.
The Kremlin's lack of a clear policy on resolving such tensions only worsens the 
situation. For example, the Ingush may cite the law "On the rehabilitation of the 
persecuted peoples," which provides for the restoration of territorial integrity as it existed 
before the deportations, to argue that Prigorodny krai is legally theirs. The Ossetians 
point to the Russian Federation Constitution, which states that a change in the borders 
between two regions can only be implemented if a majority of both regions accepts this 
change in a referendum. Was that article of the constitution meant to apply even to 
cases of post-deportation rehabilitation? No one in Moscow has formulated a cogent 
approach to this question.
The deportations created enduring cleavages among the nations of the North 
Caucasus; some persons were deported as members of a "criminal" nation, while other 
ethnic groups were spared. Some nations profited from the suffering of others and took 
over their land. The territorial changes involved in the rehabilitation created even more 
embittered parties. These antagonisms smolder just below the surface and may 
become a serious threat to stability in the region.
'Fundamentalist' Groups
Until recently, the religious factor did not play an important role in international or inter-
ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus. Even during the war over Nagorno-Karabakh 
(1988-94) between Christian Armenians and Muslim Azeris, both sides refrained from 
religious rhetoric. The situation changed dramatically after the beginning of the 1994-96 
Russian-Chechen war. Then the ideologues of Chechen independence began to use 
Islamic slogans to portray the conflict as one between the Muslims and the 
nonbelievers. At this point, a movement that was new to the region, Wahhabism, started 
to play a role in political and social life.
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Since the beginning of perestroika, devout Islamic sects have increased their activity in 
North Caucasian republics (particularly in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia). The 
CIS media have dubbed these people "Wahhabis." However, many in the North 
Caucasus justifiably consider this term to be offensive. The term "Wahhabis" is 
generally used to describe all groups of Muslims in the former Soviet Union who criticize 
features of Islam that incorporate local customs and even Soviet innovations which they 
view as corrupting influences. For instance the Chechen dance, the zikhr, which 
constitutes an important national ritual, would be forbidden under a strict Shariah law. 
The ideology of these groups is usually far removed from genuine Wahhabism, a 
movement within Sunni Islam which approximates the official ideology of Saudi Arabia. 
The disparate "fundamentalist" groups are perhaps united by one thing: They accept 
neither the old communist system nor the western model of development which has 
replaced it. As a rule, such groups attract intelligent young people from traditional, 
nonindustrial society (peasants and traders), who are not involved with any criminal 
groups.
Until September of this year, when Russian forces destroyed one of the so-called 
"Wahhabi" centers in the North Caucasus, the Dagestani village of Karamakhi, this 
settlement had seemed like a different state. Driving up to the village one saw large 
signs: "Attention! You are entering the territory under Shariah law." In the settlement 
itself, the quality of the streets and the tidiness of the houses were impressive. In the 
yard of almost every house of a local "Wahhabi" stood a Kamaz brand truck, many with 
cell phones. On the streets one rarely met a woman whose face was uncovered, and 
the men wore beards down to their chests since members of this sect are forbidden to 
shave.
"We don't smoke, don't drink, we work hard. That's the secret of our wealth. However, 
during the years of Soviet rule a whole generation formed that opposes people who live 
the life of true Muslims. They were the ones who labeled us 'Wahhabis'," declared one 
of the leaders of the village, Khalif Ataev, in 1998.
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"The term 'Wahhabi' was introduced by the FSB specifically to sow discord among the 
believers. In essence, Wahhabis include all of the people who criticize the official 
religious structures. To be accurate, the so-called North Caucasus Wahhabis could be 
called 'Salafites' [the general term for Muslim religious leaders who, at different points in 
history, advocated following the lifestyle and belief system of the early Muslim 
communes], or 'fundamentalists,'" one of the greatest Muslim scholar-theologians of 
Russia, Akhmedkadi Akhtaev, said shortly before his death. Most likely Akhtaev's point 
of view is not far from the truth, in that the term "Wahhabi" is meant to serve a 
propagandistic, not a descriptive, function.
As a Russian historian, Robert Landa, notes, "the most important key to the success of 
the fundamentalists is their wager on the young. In particular, they have managed to win 
over the allegiance of the traditional athletic clubs popular among young men. These 
date back to the time of resisting the Mongol conquerors. Later they also studied the 
Koran and the works of Muslim leaders under the guidance of mullahs." (1) Practically 
all extremely devout mosques have sports halls where karate and other eastern one-on-
one combat techniques are studied (it is this factor that ignites suspicion in outsiders). 
The mosque becomes an organization of like-minded people generally young and full of 
energy.
However, the problem is far more serious than one of minor religious differences. Before 
perestroika, Moscow managed to adapt the divergent cultures of the various peoples in 
the country to Communist ideology. This involved force and repression, which were 
possible only under a totalitarian system. Since the demise of the empire, West 
European democratic institutions have not taken root throughout large sections of the 
former USSR. The form of Islam gaining popularity is certainly anti-Russian, but it is 
also anti-modern. It is difficult to see in this ideology a basis for democratic, western-
style development. 
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Alliances
The growth in the number of religious radicals throughout the CIS is also facilitated by 
the legal anarchy rampant in almost all Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union. In 
Dagestan today, for example, power is divided between the former party nomenklatura 
and the so-called "new Dagestanis" in other words, criminal leaders who have their own 
armed units. Conflict between the so-called "Wahhabis" of Dagestan and official 
Makhachkala, Dagestan's capital, first arose when the members of the new sects 
refused to make payments to the local criminal structures. The economic devastation 
and rampant corruption of recent years have created a breeding ground for the religious 
sects, and these sects are becoming increasingly assertive. Whereas at the beginning 
of the 1990s the number of adherents to such groups among the population of 
Dagestan was no more than 2 percent, today official Makhachkala estimates that it is 
approaching 10 percent.
A year ago, a significant number of Dagestanis who support the Chechen annexation of 
parts of Dagestan underwent training in the military camps of Khattab and Shamil 
Basaev on Chechen territory. It was therefore not surprising that an overwhelming 
proportion of the fighters who invaded Dagestan with Basaev in August of this year were 
Dagestani. After that raid was repelled, the Russian forces virtually leveled the 
Karamakhi settlement, even though the local "Wahhabis" did not participate in Basaev's 
incursion into Dagestan. Surely this convinced many more Dagestanis of the 
impossibility of remaining within the Russian Federation. Through the brutality of such 
tactics the Russian military promotes the growth of separatism in Dagestan and creates 
allies for the Chechen cause among the North Caucasian people.
Grozny (now Dzhokhar) may find allies in other republics of the North Caucasus. For 
example, when the Balkars declared their intention to create their own republic in 1997, 
the Chechen field commanders promised to provide military support. The Balkars may 
aid the Chechens now. The Dagestani Chechens (Akkins) who consider the Dagestan 
region in which they reside to be indigenous Chechen territory may also come to 
Dzhokhar's aid. The Chechens may ally themselves with the Cherkess of Karachaevo-
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Cherkessia, who became embittered against the federal government due to Semenov's 
election. In fact, Mukhammad Kilba one of the closest comrades-in-arms of the losing 
candidate of the Karachaevo-Cherkessia presidential elections, Stanislav Derev fought 
together with Basaev in Abkhazia in 1992-93, and served as the deputy minister of 
defense of that separatist republic of Georgia. Kilba has already stated that if the results 
of the election in Karachaevo-Cherkessia are not nullified, he will come to Basaev's aid.
Possible Effect
Ingushetia is deeply imperiled by the continuing refugee crisis, since it is the destination 
of an overwhelming majority of fleeing Chechens. Today the number of refugees from 
Chechnya has topped 200,000. Those refugees, plus the 65,000 who fled the fighting in 
Prigorodny rayon in 1992, and the 100,000 who fled Chechnya during the last war, have 
brought the total refugee population to 365,000 roughly 120% of the population of local 
residents. (2) The tiny impoverished republic is hardly capable of accommodating such 
an influx of destitute, wounded and traumatized persons. As the president of Ingushetia, 
Ruslan Aushev, maintains, the situation in the republic is approaching a humanitarian 
catastrophe. If these circumstances continue, Ingushetia may face insurrections in the 
refugee camps.
While the introduction of Russian forces into Chechnya is described by Moscow as a 
domestic matter for the Kremlin, in reality this event affects the vital interests of the 
majority of the post-Soviet states. Naturally, the war most strongly affects the states 
nearest to Chechnya: Georgia and Azerbaijan.
According to Moscow's assertions, it is in these Caucasus nations that regiments of 
volunteers from the Muslim nations of the Far Abroad are formed to be later transferred 
to combat in Chechnya. The Kremlin never wearies of asserting that Chechen fighters 
receive arms through the territories of these nations. However, an overwhelming 
majority of the weapons are transferred to the Chechen separatists through Russian 
territory; therefore, the indignation of the Kremlin cannot be taken at face value. It 
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appears as though the Kremlin is using accusations that Baku and Tbilisi are assisting 
Dzhokhar as a pretext to assert Russian control of the Transcaucasian republics.
Thus, on the allegation that the Chechens receive aid from these Transcaucasian 
nations, Moscow attempted to force Tbilisi to transfer to Russian border guard control 
the 70-kilometer Chechnya-Georgia border and may try to induce Baku to agree to the 
installment of Russian military bases on the territory of Azerbaijan. When Baku and 
Tbilisi did not give in to the pressure, the Kremlin threatened to introduce a new visa 
regime for inhabitants of these Transcaucasian republics who travel in Russia. 
For Baku, the most dangerous circumstance is that the war in Chechnya is highly likely 
to "carry over" to the neighboring Dagestan region, and to areas heavily populated by 
Lezgins. The Russian-Azerbaijani border runs through the Lezgin area. The new visa 
regime and travel restrictions are certain to aggravate what is already a restive people. 
The Lezgins, probably with some prompting from Russia, already had declared their 
intention to secede from Azerbaijan in 1993. During the 1994-95 Chechen campaign, 
Chechnya's late president, Dzhokhar Dudaev, had tried unsuccessfully to rouse the 
Dagestani Lezgins. However, one can't completely discount the possibility that the 
followers of the first Chechen president will be more successful. With any escalation of 
tension in the Lezgin regions of Dagestan, discord would inevitably spread to 
Azerbaijan.
Thus, the current introduction of Russian forces into Chechnya sharply complicates the 
situation throughout the entire Caucasus. Having unleashed this war, the Kremlin has 
created stimuli to aggravate existing conflicts and ignite new hot spots throughout the 
region.
Notes:
1.Landa, R.G., Islam v Istorii Rossii (Moscow, 1995), p. 264.
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2.International League for Human Rights report, October 1999; via www.hro.org.
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